Leibniz

Ok, I promised myself to write this after I read up on Descartes and Spinoza. However, I've delayed for several months now, and I think it's probably because some primal, intuitive part of me screamed 'Do Not Go There!'

Oh well, no more procrastinating!

From:

- Roger Scruton's A Short History of Modern Philosophy: From Descartes to Wittgenstein, 2nd ed.
- The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Leibniz

The starting point: Spinoza & the individual
- Recall Spinoza's argument that individuals are mere expressions of God (modes of the substance).
- Spinoza also argued that therefore, immortality for humans means "[surviving] in part, and [dispersing] in the infinite mind of God." (Scruton, 65)
- Leibniz thought that if individuals are mere expressions of God, then they are
not truly individuals, and immortality has no meaning if the human does not remain an individual.
- Problem: how to reconcile the notion of the 'individual' with the notion of the 'divine substance'?


Ok, now let's start with certain principles first:
Principle of Contradiction
- If something is self-contradictory, then it is false
- Anything that is the opposite of the false is true.
- The Principle of Contradiction identifies truths of reason.
- Truths of reason are necessary.
- A necessary truth/truth of reason is true in all possible worlds.
- A necessary truth/truth of reason is knowable a priori by finite minds.

Principle of Sufficient Reason
- We can find no truth without there being a sufficient reason why it is so and not otherwise, even though most of these reasons can't be known to us.
- The Principle of Sufficient Reason identifies truths of fact.
- Truths of fact are contingent.
- A contingent truth/truth of fact is only knowable a posteriori by finite minds, through experimentation and investigation.
- Only God knows contingent truths a priori.
- While acknowledging the existence of contingent truths, Leibniz still wanted to base these truths on reason, avoiding 'pure' contingency.

The Predicate-in-Subject Principle
- In every necessary or contingent truth, the concept of the predicate is included in that of the subject.
- In other words, one who understands the subject perfectly would also know that the predicate belongs to it.

Ok, now we move on.

Monads
- Entities are either composite or simple.
- Composite entities are divisible and extended.
- Simple entities are Monads.
- Monads:
- are indivisible (true substances)
- cannot be extended
- can be distinguished from each other by their predicates (properties)
- can't be created/destroyed by the natural course of things -- can only be created/destroyed by a miracle
- Every monad has a Complete Notion.
- A complete notion is a complete list of its predications.
- Each monad's complete notion is unique -- while it might share some of its predications with other monads, no monad shares a complete list of predications.
- A living force (vis viva) generates monads' perceptions.
- The living force also allows us to individuate monads even if we do not know their complete notions.
- An example of a monad is the human soul.

Leibniz "rejects the dualist position that the universe must therefore be bifurcated into two different kinds of substance, thinking substance, and material substance. Rather, it is his view that the world consists solely of one type of substance, though there are infinitely many substances of that type. These substances are partless, unextended entities, some of which are endowed with thought and consciousness, and others of which found the phenomenality of the corporeal world." (S1, para. 15, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-mind/)

God
- God is a monad.
- God is a perfect being.
- Therefore God's complete notion can contain no negative predications. (would violate Principle of Contradiction)
- God has to exist because the existent of contingent things cannot be found in other contingent things (first cause argument - God as an entity that 'carries the reason for existence within itself')
- This world is the best of all possible worlds - God being perfect, cannot create a world that not as good as it could have been.


Problem: Contingent vs Necessary Truths
- Consider the statement 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon'
- The complete notion of 'Caesar' includes the predicated 'crossed the Rubicon' (Predicate-in-Subject Principle)
- One who did not cross the Rubicon cannot be Caesar.
- 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon' is a necessary truth. (Principle of Contradiction)
- In that case, all statements that are not illogical satisfy the Principle of Contradiction, and become necessary truths.
- How do we distinguish between contingent and necessary truths then?
Leibniz:
- If Caesar's existence was a necessary truth, that Caesar crossed the Rubicon would be a necessary truth.
- But since Caesar's existence is contingent on God creating him, there is the possibility that Caesar might not have existed and therefore might not have crossed the Rubicon, and therefore, that Caesar crossed the Rubicon is not a necessary truth.

Leading to the next problem...

Problem: Divine Freedom
- Since God is by nature perfect, he has to create the best possible world.
- Therefore God has no freedom to create a world other than this world.
- If this is so, why should humans thank God for making a decision in which he has no choice?
The crux: 2 conceptions of freedom:
1. Freedom as being free from external interference - no one intervened in God's decision to create this world and therefore, God freely made this world.
2. Freedom as being free to choose one decision or the other - God would not have been able to choose a lesser world without retaining his complete perfection and therefore, God did not freely make this world.
The implications for Caesar: (this is my extrapolation, so pls pls pls tell me if something is wrong)
- That God created the best possible world is a necessary truth.
- This best possible world contained Caesar, so Caesar's existence is necessary.
- Since Caesar's existence is necessary, Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon is necessary.
- Therefore we return to the same quagmire of distinguishing between necessary and contingent truths.

[Note: Leibniz's phrase that God's motives 'incline without necessitating' means that although God's nature makes his actions necessary, but this doesn't mean his actions are necessary (as opposed to contingent - see above Principle of Contradiction and Principle of Sufficient Reason).]

Living Organisms: Mind and Body
- A living organism is an aggregate of many monads.
- "For something to be a genuine unity, it must be a simple, indivisible entity. [ie. monads]" ( S1, para.11, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-mind/)
- Therefore while a living organism is an aggregate, it is a 'well-founded phenomena' in that it is constituted of monads (genuine entities).
- Leibniz believed that mind and body are separate, but also believed that they were created by the same sort of entity (different types of monads).
- Leibniz rejected Descartes' claim that the mind can influence the body, or that the body can influence the mind.
- Since an individual is an aggregate and not a true unity, and individual cannot have a perception/consciousness.
- Hence, Leibniz rejects any causal relations between mind and body.
- Leibniz recognizes that our minds and bodies seem inter-related.
- But he suggests that a state of mind is caused by a previous state of mind, and a state of body is caused by a previous state of body.
- Leibniz posits that at our creation, our monads (in both mind and body) were programmed to coordinate with each other.
- Hence, the appearance of causal relations between the mind and body is merely the result of God's Pre-Established Harmony of all monads.
- Because all monads evolve in harmony with each other, each monad is like a mirror of the universe.

Perception and Appearance
- Monads cannot be extended, and therefore they do not occupy time or space.
- The physical objects appear to follow natural laws of time and space, but these natural laws don't operate at the 'genuine' level of monads.
- Therefore, the appearance of the world is organised and understood in ways that don't represent the underlying reality. (Scruton)
- But the world of appearance is a by-product of activities of monads (which act according to the pre-established harmony).
- Hence, the world of appearance is not just mere appearance. It is systematic appearance, the result of the harmonious activities of monads.

Back to the Beginning
- Leibniz tries to address the problem of the disappearance of individuals.
- He ends up saying that most of what looks like a unity (an individual) is not truly a unit but an aggregate.

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I'm not at all sure of any of the above. I nearly killed myself trying to get this far. I left out the stuff on whether there IS a best possible world, or whether there're worlds that are neither better nor worse nor equal to each other etc.

Anyone out there, please, if I've made an mistake or if you think anything can be clarified, please please please tell me.

Descartes and Spinoza

This is all LSB's fault. *blames boyfriend indiscriminately*

I've been reading:

- Roger Scruton's A Short History of Modern Philosophy: From Descartes to Wittgenstein, 2nd ed.
- Joan A. Price's Philosophy Through the Ages

I'm not a philo person, even though I must say I'm very attracted to philo books, largely because they tend to be on the extreme end of incomprehensible. I've studied some philosophers before, but largely in context of political thought or political ideology, hardly conducive to the mind-numbing finger-gnawing zen state I wish to achieve. My knowledge of philosophy is very very rudimentary.

So I've decided to study them philosophers a bit more systematically, starting with Descartes. I'm giving the ancients a wide berth because (and this is my own theory) they're so distant and difficult to relate to.

I've made it through Descartes & Spinoza, and for the sake of consolidation, have (largely) paraphrased what I have learnt below. I don't know if I've understood everything perfectly, and would appreciate (if any of you make it through) any corrections.

Ok *deep breath* let's do this before I get lazy.

Descartes

The starting point: take nothing for granted.

- What if an evil genius had deceived me into thinking what I think?
- If such a genius exists, then I don't know if this world is real, or if I am myself real.
- How can I know the truth? I cannot trust my senses. I can only trust the 'natural light of reason'.

'Cogito ergo sum.'

- What can I ascertain is necessarily true?
- To start with, the moment I think 'I exist', I must necessarily exist. The thought 'I exist' is self-verifying because I have to exist in order to think that thought.
- It is also necessarily true that I think. For even if I think that I don't think, in that very act of doubt, I am thinking.

Distinction between Body and Soul (Mind)

- I know that I exist as a thing that thinks.
- I find that every other thing about me can change except my ability to think. I cannot conceive of myself as not thinking, but my body can grow old, or I can lose a leg or my sight.
- Therefore my body is not of essence to me; my mind is my essence.
- Therefore I could conceivably exist (as a 'soul') after my body has ceased.
- Therefore, I am a substance which involves thinking; I endure through change. But my physical form is an attribute which can change without altering the substance.

God: The Cosmological Argument

- Something cannot come from nothing; more cannot come from less. Ideas are effects and have causes.
- I do not have perfect knowledge because I doubt. Therefore I am imperfect. Yet I have the idea of perfection (God).
- Where did my idea of perfection come from? My idea of perfection is an effect of something. There must be a cause of this idea of perfection.
- The idea of perfection cannot come from my imperfect self. The idea of perfection must come from perfection, i.e. God.

The Honest God

- Since God is perfect, and since intuitively, we know that deceit stems from imperfection, we know that God cannot be the evil genius we hypothesized earlier.
- Since God does not seek to deceive us, this means that if we use our reason and our senses (given to us by God for that very purpose) to their greatest ability, we will perceive the truth.

Objections to Descartes

The Existence of Error

- If God does not deceive, why does he allow the possibility of error?
- Descartes' answer: Error occurs when we choose to assent to an idea that is not the perceived through the 'natural light of reason'.
- Scruton: "Human error is therefore the necesary consequence of human freedom, and this seeming evil is part of a real and greater good." (33)

The Evil Genius Objection (The Cartesian circle)

- If the perfect God exists, then we know that our God-given faculty of reason will lead us to the truth. However, we only 'know' that the perfect God exists through our faculty of reason. Our conclusion that God exists depends on the reliability of our reason, which depends on God existing in the first place.

The Mind-Body Problem

- If the mind and body are separate, how do they interact with each other? How is it that the mind and body are joined in one person? ie. what is to prevent mind and body from going their own separate ways?
- Descartes: the soul is joined to the whole body through the pineal gland.
- But how can the non-physical mind be joined to the body through a physical gland? Doesn't this return to the question of how the mind can be connected to the physical body (or part of it)?

The First-Person Privilege

- Descartes assumes that while I cannot be sure of the world around me, I have a privileged knowledge of what I think and feel. My mind thinks exactly what it thinks it thinks. Is this necessarily true?

The Illusion of the Idea of Perfection

- Do we truly have an idea of perfection? Or do we merely have an idea of the 'extremely good' or 'extremely desirable'? What does perfection mean?

Spinoza

Substance

- Spinoza was a descendant of Descartes (who was in turn a descendant of Aristotle).
- Recall Descartes' arguments about 'substance'
- Spinoza argued that a substance is entirely self-contained. It depends on nothing outside itself for its existence; it is not caused by anything, but is its own cause.
- Therefore, only God is a substance, for God is his own cause (causa sui).

God: Thought and Extension

- Spinoza argues that God is a substance with infinite attributes, and all God's attributes are infinite. Hence all attributes are attributes of God's. These include the attributes of 'extension' in space (matter) and thought.
- While God might have attributes besides extension and thought, because we are finite, we can only know these two attributes of God.
- Because both thought and extension are attributes of God, we can comprehend God through thought and extension.

God and Nature

- When we comprehend God through extension, we understand him as 'Nature'. When we comprehend God through thought, we know him as 'God'. Because both thought and extension each constitute the essence of God, each "present[s] to the intellect a full and adequate [clearly & distinctly true] idea of what God is." (Scruton, 51)
- God and Nature are the same.

Solving Descartes' Mind-Body Problem

- Since thought and extension are both essences of God, there is no difference between them.
- Our finite minds are part of God's infinite thought, and our finite bodies are part of God's infinite extension.
- Thus we are but expressions of God.
- Thus my mind is the same as my body.
- I perceive my mind and body to be different only because the modes of thought and extension present me with different pictures. When I use the mode of thought to understand myself, I perceive myself as 'mind'; when I use the mode of extension, I perceive myself as 'body'.
- Scruton's analogy: "When I look at a picture I see physical objects: patches of pigment smeared on a canvas. And I can describe these objects so thoroughly as to account for the entire picture. ... the other thing I see: a stag hunt passing before a country house. This too I could describe so thoroughly as to give a complete account of the picture. But the two accounts are incommensurable... I cannot describe the lead hound as frantically pursuing a patch of ochre." (53)

The Problem of Free Will

- Since both thought and matter stem from the divine substance (God), everything happens not by chance but by necessity.
- Thoughts must relate to each other in a series of logical, necessary steps. (eg. mathematical proofs)
- Matter too, must relate to each other in a necessary sequence. Events follow each other ina necessary sequence.
- The implication for humans is that, being mere expressions of God, we too are the effects and not causes, as are our actions and thoughts. Since only God is able to 'cause', we are not able to cause anything, and therefore it would seem that we have no free will.
- If there is no freedom to act or think differently, the idea of morality collapses. To judge someone as good or bad, one must believe that that person could have caused himself to act differently.

Spinoza's Freedom

- Spinoza argues that the distinction between free/unfree is not the same as that between caused/uncaused.
- To react in an emotional way is to react passively because we endure emotions. When I am passive I am therefore not free.
- Since the mode of thought and the mode of extension correspond to each other, for every adequate idea (thought), there is an ideatum (extension).
- Thus it makes sense that a person who is more physically active has more adequate ideas of his behaviour and the causes of his behaviour.
- A free person is one who masters his emotions (passivity) and has adequate ideas about the world. He understands the world better, and thus understands God better.
- The free person who masters his passions understands the world and thus grows to love it. Since the world is God, he also loves God, not in a passive emotional way, but in an intellectual way.
- Thus the way to happiness and freedom is through the refinement of the intellect and the mastery of emotions.

I definitely died while trying to get through Spinoza. Sighz.